One often hears that, as the stronger party, Israel bears the lion's share of the responsibility for the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict persists. However, I argue that (a) although the Palestinians are the weaker party, their politics and culture also play highly significant roles in perpetuating the conflict--as they also must in solving it, if that is ever to happen--and (b) advocates of peace and justice who ignore Palestinians' agency are, in addition to being condescending towards Palestinians, setting themselves up for failure.
One often hears that, as the stronger party, Israel bears the lion's share of the responsibility for the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict persists. However, I argue that (a) although the Palestinians are the weaker party, their politics and culture also play highly significant roles in perpetuating the conflict--as they also must play in solving it, if that is ever to happen--and (b) advocates of peace and justice who ignore Palestinians' agency are (in addition to being condescending towards Palestinians) setting themselves up for failure.
A disclaimer: far be it from me to claim that Israel behaves as a saint. I've already talked about the problems that the settlements pose for a two-state solution, and I'm going to post sometime about the dangerous mainstreaming of far right politics in Israel. But the fact is that in my political community (the Left), these phenomena already receive plenty of criticism. The goal of this post is to pressure my own community to acknowledge the sources of the conflict that fit less neatly into the story that it often likes to tell. GENERAL REMARKS: There's a persistent view in certain parts of the left that in asymmetrical conflicts, the stronger party generally has the power to unilaterally determine the rules of the game and even end the conflict. Therefore, the thinking goes, the lion's share of moral responsibility for the continuation of the conflict, and for any unfavorable conditions stemming from how it is conducted, rests squarely on the stronger party. However, the first part of this view is an empirical claim, and, I submit, it is not borne out by the historical evidence. But in fact, one can see this even in the abstract, without delving into actual, complicated cases. In the absence of international law, when a people loses a war on its own territory, it is very much in that people's interest to negotiate a surrender agreement, even on very unfavorable terms (for it). That is because the alternative--continuing the fight in the form of a guerilla insurgency--means that the winning army will kill anyone who could be, or could be abetting, enemy militants. In a guerilla insurgency, the militants hide among the civilians; so that means everyone is at risk. Plus, there is a risk of atrocities against civilians by bad actors on the winning side, regardless of whether those civilians might have been reasonably suspected of being or abetting militants. Again, the point is that knowing that this is the alternative provides a strong incentive for the conquered people to end the conflict and negotiate an agreement. By contrast, international law calls upon states that win wars to refrain from ravaging their opponents' territories, destroying civilian infrastructure and committing massacres. Without a doubt, this is overall a very good thing and has saved millions of lives. However, where the winning party is a state that has committed itself to respecting international law, this does serve to encourage insurgencies and prolonged conflict. Here is how: In this setting, the stronger party no longer has the leverage to force the weaker party to end the conflict. The weaker party has less of an incentive to stop fighting, since it knows it can pursue a guerilla war that attrits the stronger party's forces, while relying on the stronger party's international commitment to refrain from abusing its (the weaker party's) population. Of course, in this setting the stronger party may still have the power to end the conflict by unilaterally softening or even renouncing some of its demands. But this is something that the weaker party can also do to end the conflict; it is not a "stop button" that belongs only to the stronger party. Coming soon: discussion of critically overlooked aspects of Palestinian culture and society, including: The Intricacies of Palestinian Politics The division between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority The unpopularity of the Palestinian Authority The risks that Palestinian politicians who compromise face from their own population Uncertainties about who will succeed Mahmoud Abbas What Many Palestinians Want The Great March of Return Palestinian culture -- the key symbol, their literature, their education system -- maps & examples The BDS movement
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