CAPTION: Ernest Renan, author of some canonical accounts of nationalism and peoplehood
In this post, I host a debate between nationalism, which defends the existence of states as we have in the current international system, and internationalism, which would have most states surrender much of their sovereignty to larger international units.
I am very grateful to The Tel Aviv Review for recently hosting a helpful and inspiring discussion on this topic with the inimitable peace activist, scholar, and liberal Zionist Yuli Tamir. You can check that episode out here. I invite readers to listen to their other episodes for more very helpful material related to this and many of my other posts.
My posts on Liberal and Leftist Zionism and One State vs. Two States generated some deeper discussion about the moral and practical value of the international state system, with nationalists defending the state system and internationalists advocating a different international order. In this post, I host that debate as it continues in earnest, abstracting out a little from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In several coming updates to this post, I will be delighted to welcome my distinguished guest, Internationalist, who will be making the case for (surprise!) internationalism, while I will be making the case for nationalism. We will both draw on comments from earlier blog posts. For clarity, in what follows, my own writing will appear in black, while material from Internationalist will appear in dark red. THE QUESTION AT ISSUE: At this time and for the foreseeable future, what is the (morally) best way for power and resources to be distributed among human groups at the global scale? THE SPECTRUM OF VIEWS: Following Valar84's insightful comments, we can distinguish four different views on the question at issue, arranged along a spectrum:
In what follows, I will be defending Cooperative Nationalism (henceforth I'll just call it "nationalism"), while Internationalist will, I take it, be defending International Federalism (henceforth "internationalism"). THE CASE FOR COOPERATIVE NATIONALISM: For clarity, it is useful to distinguish two different but mutually compatible ways of arguing for moral claims such as nationalism:
Basic Assumptions:
Now for the more controversial view:
Argument for the State Principle: In general, and, in particular, in the current international reality, having an independent nation-state tends to be the best way to guarantee that a people's right of self-determination will be respected. That's because the most effective way for a people to succeed in determining its own fate is for the money, military, and other institutions of a state to be directed toward carrying out that people's will. A few complications need to be acknowledged here. First, while I have claimed that, generally, the most effective way for a people to determine its own fate is to have its own state, I have not claimed that states inevitably act according to the wills of their peoples. Indeed, few states always act exactly according to the wills of their peoples, and some of them are so corrupt that they pretty much never do. Moreover, as Internationalist points out elsewhere (see also the "Economic Point" below), to stay afloat, a state government has to foster trade with and attract outside investment from other states/entities. This can drive even well-meaning states to act against the interests of their own peoples, or important segments thereof, such as the working class. Despite these complications, I remain convinced that the generally most effective way for a people to determine its own fate is for it to have its own state. For consider the alternative, international organizations such as the UN and NGOs. Are these organizations less susceptible to the problems that plague states? On inspection, international organizations tend to do even worse than a dedicated state at acting on a people's will. In particular, they have proven generally much less effective than states at carrying out the most basic functions of any government: preventing genocides and other abuses of the human rights of those they represent, setting up administrative structures, and fostering economic growth. One important reason for this is that because international organizations represent more than just that people, they have other mandates; these are not organizations whose sole purpose is to be the vehicle by which that people determines its own fate. Rather, they have to operate on the consensus of more heterogenous groups (in the case of the UN, those nation-states!) who fund and run the organization. A second, related point is the following. For a non-repressive government to have functioning institutions, most importantly a functioning military, the population has to have a strong shared identity. Otherwise various factions (and in the case of the military, militias) arise, each of whose primary loyalty is to the group that it represents. These factions vie for control, causing dysfunction and even civil war. Because international (inter-national) organizations by definition comprise and represent a variety of quite different peoples, they often do not succeed in tapping into individuals' most deeply held identities. This leaves them much more vulnerable to the deep divisions that make for dysfunction. Another reason why international organizations tend to be less effective than states at executing the wills of peoples is that they don't have the money or institutional organization to carry out national-scale projects effectively. This is especially true in the case of NGOs and many organizations under the UN umbrella. An exception is the UN Security Council, but here there is difficulty in building consensus to embark on large-scale projects or operations. I won't argue the point in detail, but similar claims hold for individual rights. In general, but especially in the current international reality, citizenship in a nation-state is the best way to guarantee that an individual's basic rights will be respected. A separate argument for the State Principle is the following: whether or not having its own state is the generally best way to guarantee a people's self-determination, in actual fact most peoples prefer to be governed by their own independent states rather than by any broader international organization. Therefore, for most peoples, any broader international organization that governed them in place of them having their own independent state would be governing them against their will and thus violating their right to determine their own fate. THE CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL FEDERALISM ("INTERNATIONALISM"): An Economic Point: Capital (that is, money, goods, and resources used as inputs in the production of other goods and resources, and/or expected to yield a return to their owners) is both privately owned and controlled, and highly mobile within and across international borders. Capital mobility allows a tiny minority (those who own substantial amounts of capital) to exercise veto power over democratic majorities. That is to say: in practice, nation-states do not serve the interests of their peoples as a whole. Rather, they primarily serve the interests of those members of the people who own substantial amounts of capital, as well foreign capitalists who invest in the country. In general, states serve the interests of foreign investors much more effectively than they serve the interests of their own working class citizens. This is not an accident, but rather something that governments have to do if they want to attract foreign investment and thereby generate the employment and tax revenue that will sustain them in power. This point also raises a complication for the nationalist's claim that any broader international organization that governed a people in place of their own independent state would be governing them against their will: the design of the current, decentralized international system to respect the independent rights of states also entails the imposition of all sorts of political-economic arrangements on unwilling people.
Rights
The “Easy Cases”
I think we can draw at least two general theses from this analysis of the “easy cases”. I. Statehood for one people often comes at the expense of self-determination rights for other peoples.
II. Statehood for a people sometimes leads to less self-determination even for that people.
OBJECTION: It might be objected that the complications arising from these cases are the result of various peoples refusing to respect one another’s self-determination rights. This no more refutes the existence of self-determination or statehood rights, this objection goes, than a widespread refusal to respect bodily autonomy rights shows the non-existence of rights to bodily autonomy. The problem is that LZ has based her/his case for statehood-rights in claims about the unfeasibility (at least at this time) of further international political integration. The record of international organizations like the UN is supposed to show that international political integration will not produce better results than national independence. But as Dani[4] points out, the failures of these international organizations are due to insufficient commitment to international cooperation. If it is objected that it is naïve to expect existing nation-states to sufficiently commit to cooperating, then why is it not equally naïve to expect emerging nation-states, great and regional powers, and nationalist movements to respect the self-determination rights of other peoples? [1] “The National Question,” Przeglad Socialdemokratyczny [Social Democratic Review] 1908-1909. Part I, “The Right of Nations to Self-Determination.” https://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1909/national-question/index.htm [2] https://liberalzionist.weebly.com/posts/one-state-vs-two-states; comment at 7/3/2019 08:22:35 am. [3] https://liberalzionist.weebly.com/posts/one-state-vs-two-states [4] https://liberalzionist.weebly.com/posts/statism-vs-internationalism#comments; at 8/3/2019 05:14:15 pm REPLY ON BEHALF OF NATIONALISM: An Important Clarification: Since I agree with much of what Internationalist wrote, I worry a little that we are simply defending the same or very similar positions under different labels. For example, consider the following important clarification. In earlier versions of this post, I framed the discussion in terms of "nation-states". By "nation-state", I mean: state whose purpose is to serve as the vehicle for a certain single people to determine its own fate. However, throughout, I do not assume that peoplehood is identical with shared ethnicity, language, or religion. E.g., I’d be willing to say that there is an American people, even though the USA is quite multi-ethnic, as well as diverse with respect to language and religion; and even though its citizens are, between them, members of many different peoples. I'd say similar things about some of the other multi-national states, including India, the UK, and Canada. This raises an important point: a state can be both a nation-state and a multi-national state, because its members can when taken together constitute one people, while also among them belonging to a variety of different peoples. This in turn is because an individual can belong to multiple different peoples at once. One can be a Jew and an American; one can be a Palestinian and a Chilean; one can be a Tamil, an Indian, and a Brit, all at once; etc. Why is this relevant? Internationalist presents multi-national states as an alternative to single-nation states. But in fact, many states are both, including some of the most successful examples. For a contrast case, I take Switzerland to be an example of a multi-national state that is not a nation-state, because insofar as there is a Swiss people / Swiss identity, it is arguably substantially weaker than the other identities that are found amongst the population of that country. Some examples of other, less well-functioning multi-national states that are not nation-states might be Iraq and Syria. Let's say that a state is purely multi-national if it is a multi-national state whose population does not, taken together, constitute a people. Admittedly, my clarification raises the worry that the debate becomes trivial. If peoplehood is defined so loosely that the populations of multi-national states also count as peoples, then why can't we say this about the Europeans under a hypothetical United States of Europe, or indeed about every multi-national state, and even every government whatsoever? However, I think this worry has an answer that’s substantive and at least initially plausible. As explained above, for a group to count as a people, its members have to have a strong shared identity. (For one famous account of what that might be, see again my link to the Renan piece.) The most common strong shared identities are based on culture, language, and religion, since those are things that people care very deeply about; but for my own part, I'd be willing to allow that the identity could be based on pretty much anything. In the case of the USA, American identity is arguably defined not by ethnicity or language (despite the efforts of certain conservatives!) but by commitment to certain principles—of democracy, religious and cultural tolerance, and individual rights. By contrast, no sufficiently strong shared identity currently exists in Europe at this time. Nor can it be assumed to exist in the general case, simply because people are living under the same government. (Though in time that can itself catalyze the formation of a shared identity, as it has in some post colonial states such as India.) It conceivably could exist in Europe, and many other places, if someone cultivated/articulated a shared identity and it took off. (See also Dani’s comment below about a pan-ethnic human identity.) That is, peoples come and go in history, and nothing I say rules out that some clever politicians or intellectuals could articulate a pan-European identity that Europeans could identify with strongly enough and in sufficient numbers. The same goes for any population, and even for the idea of an all-inclusive human identity, though in the latter case I’m pretty skeptical. At any rate, let me be clear that on my view, wherever there is a strong enough shared identity, the people defined by that identity has a defeasible right to a state of its own, even where the identity in question is not based on cultural, linguistic, historical, or religious ties. If all that internationalism says is that we should try to cultivate more inclusive identities than the ones that exist now and then form nation-states whose mission is to cater to those more inclusive identities, then the difference between it and nationalism is merely one of degree. I do think, though, that empirically, inclusivity and strength in an identity tend to be inversely related, for the simple reason that people find it easiest to make sacrifices for those with whom they feel they share the most. Which is why liberal nationalism, let alone internationalism, is hard to cultivate! Even with this clarification, however, my sense is that Internationalist would still want to reject the State Principle. That is: on Internationalist's view, even though the identities of some peoples are quite inclusive, it is still not the case that every people has a right to a state (even a defeasible right). Responses to Internationalist's Main Points: re: economic point, Internationalist writes:
re: governing people against their will:
Now, one might try to explain away these attitudes (on the part of working class Germans, PIIGS citizens, and Palestinians) as merely effects of nationalist propaganda. But I think this interpretation is uncharitable and inaccurate. It ignores the fact that, for many peoples, having a state of their own tends to be deeply meaningful and a matter of national pride. At any rate, surely anyone who wants to explain these reactions away bears the burden of proof. re: easy cases, Internationalist writes:
re: easy cases, Internationalist writes:
Absent any shred of benevolence on behalf of the strongest nation-states, little prevents emerging nation-states from trampling the self-determination of militarily weaker peoples. That is why one of the most important roles of the strongest states in the international system is to incentivize protection of minorities and inhibit territorial conquest, by conditioning a state's access to the benefits of the international system (such as protected passage of goods on international waterways, flyover rights for commercial flights, mail delivery, etc.) on good behavior by that state. Secondly, in cases in which consensus can be built, there is the option of international sanctions, and, in extreme cases, even the option for coalitions of states to go in and intervene with force. Sadly and all-too-obviously, these are very imperfect mechanisms, and often fail to deter states from violating other peoples' self-determination rights. But still, the threat of these measures is a more realistic safeguard than the demand that nation-states or nationalist movements relinquish sovereignty wholesale. In brief: better to grant sovereignty to those groups with the strength to attain and maintain it, and then work to curb the abuses that arise, than to deny sovereignty and invite even greater recalcitrance and bloodshed. FINAL REMARKS FROM INTERNATIONALIST: Below is a streamlined version. See Internationalist's full response here. Response to Liberal Zionist’s Clarification:
Liberal Zionist: I don't see why international organizations, unions, or purely multi-national states would be less vulnerable to [the problem of states serving the interests of foreign investors more than their own working-class citizens] than nation-states are. Reply: It is not that multinational states are less vulnerable to the structural tendency of states to favor the interests of capital because they are multinational. Rather, larger states are less vulnerable to this tendency, other things being equal, because larger states have larger populations and larger internal markets. This because investors fear getting shut out of larger markets (through, for example, tariffs imposed on manufacturers who offshore production abroad) much more than they fear getting shut out of smaller markets. But if a multinational state breaks up along national (or any other) lines, the new states will have, by definition, smaller populations and markets. The smaller states would be forced to into a race to the bottom with each other, competing for investment capital by offering low wages, unsafe labor standards, lax environmental regulations and so on. They may offer themselves as havens for wealthy tax evaders as well. Liberal Zionist: But all this shows is that the current state system is, like all other systems of governance, imperfect. What we need is an argument that the state system is worse than the alternative when it comes to respecting the will of those it governs. And here it is significant that, if one asked working class Germans whether they'd be willing to give up the existence of a German state in exchange for fixing the problems that Internationalist describes, most would probably refuse. Reply: Actually, defending the State Principle, which is (in part) what LZ wishes to do, requires more than just defending the status quo, because the status quo does not perfectly realize the right to independent nation-statehood. A large part of my argument has been conservative (in the sense of pro-status quo bias): given the risks involved in creating new states along national lines, we should be wary of recognizing the existence of a general “right” to create such states, since the right to statehood implies the right of creation as well as preservation. As for whether working class (and other) Germans would be willing at present to give up substantial formal sovereignty to deal with the economic problems I have identified, I share LZ’s skepticism. But these economic issues are especially tricky subjects. The connection between Germany’s fiscal and labor market policies and the peripheral European debt crisis is not obvious even to highly educated people, so it is not surprising that most Germans don’t see things this way either. Instead, the prevailing view, probably among people of all social classes, is that southern Europeans are lazy spendthrifts who are taking advantage of German industriousness. I think this is view is wrong, but I don’t think most Germans are particularly blameworthy for holding it, given its hegemonic “common sense” appeal and the complexity of alternative explanations. But most Germans also don’t like (what are in my view) the consequences of the status quo. If I am right, they will have to choose at some point. The German public strongly supports European monetary union, but such monetary union, as I have argued, is extremely difficult to manage without fiscal union. Germans and others may not support full-blown fiscal union yet, but eventually, in my view, something will have to give, and I can’t see the Euro being abandoned (though I could be wrong). Theoretically, I can imagine Germans and other national groups, out of national pride, indefinitely refusing to trade away any greater degree of sovereignty, no matter how bad the economic pain gets. But would even this scenario imply an overall retention of sovereignty and self-determination for all national groups? After all, the austerity regime imposed by the European Union on Greece in the wake of the debt crisis was a bigger constraint on the economic-policy self-determination of Greeks than anything I am proposing with respect to Germany. It was admittedly more temporary than my recommendations, but it if I am correct about the economic trends, such constraints will need to be reimposed periodically on countries like Greece in the future, unless the European Union imposes other kinds of restraints on policy (toward, e.g., less fiscal austerity and more wage growth) on countries like Germany. This raises a further point. LZ has tried to frame the alternatives before us as more self-determination/sovereignty or no (or less) self-determination/sovereignty. But I am increasingly convinced that self-determination and sovereignty will weaken no matter what institutional set-up we create, and I am not even sure that my preferred set-up will erode self-determination/sovereignty more quickly than the status quo. It will probably erode formal sovereignty (e.g., the ability of national legislatures to pass laws concerning certain policy domains), but the status quo is eroding substantive sovereignty at an incredibly rapid pace, and one major reason is because it grants existing states a great deal of formal sovereign power. The sorts of interventions in what are traditionally regarded as the “internal affairs” of other states are meant precisely to prevent those states from undermining the effectiveness of other states’ “internal” policies. This is in many ways an extension my point, made earlier, that the exercise of self-determination by one, at least insofar as it involves the exercise of the coercive power of a state, in practice undermines the self-determination of other groups. Liberal Zionist: And the same is even more plausible in the case of most citizens of PIIGS countries, simply because since World War II the political culture and education in Germany has been comparatively very cautious about cultivating nationalist sentiments. (Disclaimer: I have not conducted these polls, so I am willing to stand corrected.) Reply: If I recall correctly, Germans are more likely than PIIGS citizens to agree with the idea of greater integration in the abstract (e.g., when you ask them outright, “Do you support the eventual creation of a United States of Europe?”), but (unsurprisingly) far less likely when you ask them about specific integrative policies that would impose obvious short term cost on Germany and short term benefit to the PIIGS. For example, one obvious step toward fiscal union would be the creation of “Eurobonds”, sovereign bonds issued jointly by the Eurozone countries (not to be confused with external bonds, also called “Eurobonds”). But this would mean Germany guaranteeing the debt of more debt-prone countries like Greece and Italy, which is presumably why Germans oppose them by more than 5-to-1 (https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-poll-germans-strongly-against-eurobonds-2011nov25-story.html). Liberal Zionist: Indeed, compare in this connection the Palestinians. Quite recently, they adamantly rejected a peace plan that in all likelihood would offer them something short of an independent state in exchange for dramatically improved economic conditions. [LZ adds: “Here I referred to the Trump economic plan, but it could also arguably be said about the political part of Trump’s plan.”] One might doubt whether those offering this deal would actually have made good on what was promised; but it is highly plausible that the Palestinians would also have rejected more believable offers. And, in my view, reasonably so, as long as those offers were meant to establish a final arrangement. As many Palestinian politicians took pains to emphasize, to them, no easing of economic conditions, however substantial, could be an adequate substitute for political sovereignty. Reply: The Palestinian Authority did indeed reject the proposal Liberal Zionist mentions, almost certainly because the Palestinian public prefers, for the time being at least, what they understandably regard as national dignity to economic relief. But how long can this be expected to go on? There are innumerable examples in history of nations submitting to foreign conquerors in exchange for improved material conditions. Often this surrender only happens after heroic resistance, but it happens nonetheless. Indeed, many observers believe that the Palestinian leadership surrendered to Israel long ago. According to this analysis (which I endorse in broad measure), at Oslo PLO under Yasser Arafat abandoned its national liberation struggle and agreed to become a subcontractor for the Israeli occupation in certain designated areas of the West Bank, providing “security services” (including arbitrary imprisonment and often torture of Palestinian dissidents) for Israel rather than continuing the struggle for national independence. What’s more, Israel made minimal concessions in response, refusing even to halt settlement expansion (settlements continued to grow all through the Oslo process, though at a much less rapid pace than in previous decades). It is true that the Palestinian leadership still refuses to formally ratify its surrender by agreeing to various annexationist proposals put forth by Israel and the US, but all this means is that it has surrendered in substantive rather than formal terms. Since Oslo, the PLO has resigned itself to more or less permanent Israeli occupation, even if it refuses to admit this to the Palestinian people or to the world. The status quo is one of Israeli state control over the entire territory of the Holy Land, and nothing the Palestinian leadership does challenges the status quo in any important way. Perhaps at some point the PA will formally agree to accept a pseudo-state, but even if it does not, a continuance of the status quo would be hardly less of a surrender of the national self-determination of the Palestinian people. (Nor is this merely a case of a “comprador” leadership betraying the authentically nationalist Palestinian masses. Israel, like all military occupiers throughout history, relies on an extensive network of collaborators, the bulk of whom are “ordinary people” enticed to collaborate through material incentives, such as bribes, or the threat of imprisonment or torture. The decision to collaborate is no doubt in many cases eminently understandable, but the fact that so many make this choice belies the notion that Palestinian nationalism, of either the leadership or the “people”, is immune to material incentives.) Liberal Zionist: Now, one might try to explain away these attitudes (on the part of working class Germans, PIIGS citizens, and Palestinians) as merely effects of nationalist propaganda. But I think this interpretation is uncharitable and inaccurate. It ignores the fact that, for many peoples, having a state of their own tends to be deeply meaningful and a matter of national pride. At any rate, surely anyone who wants to explain these reactions away bears the burden of proof. Reply: I don’t deny that national pride is a real and immensely consequential sentiment in human affairs, and that it often if not mostly manifests itself as a desire for an independent and (formally and substantively) sovereign nation-state. Of course, it is often exploited by ruling elites for their own interests, but the reason it is so easily exploited is because so many are genuinely committed to it. All I deny is that most peoples will continue to prioritize this desire in the face of indefinitely intensifying material disincentives to do so. At some point, the material advantages of surrendering formal sovereignty (or the material pain necessary to maintain it) will become too great to ignore. Even if they do not, however, I believe that substantive sovereignty will become increasingly impossible in any case. CONCLUDING REMARKS FROM LIBERAL ZIONIST: I have more to say and even more to think about, but I will honor my promise to give Internationalist the final word. I offer my humblest gratitude for a very stimulating discussion; may it be the first of many to come!
6 Comments
Dani
8/3/2019 05:14:15 pm
Looking forward to this debate! To preface my comment, I'm wondering whether ‘globalism’ is a better term than ‘internationalism’? Because it sounds like you define internationalism as a stance against nations at all, maybe ‘antinationalism’ if you will. Or do you define internationalism as the rejection of some other specific aspect of “statism”?
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Dani
8/3/2019 05:15:25 pm
...But, if greater global unity is something we value, I believe we can actively work to foster it.
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LiberalZionist
8/4/2019 09:59:50 am
Thank you, Dani, for your many stimulating comments!
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LiberalZionist
8/4/2019 10:13:01 am
(...continued...)
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Valar84
8/9/2019 10:38:53 pm
Very good discussion of this fundamental question that is curiously ignored in most discussions... But why call it statism rather than nationalism which seems to me to be a more accurate description of what you describe? Statism to my knowledge is a term mostly used by libertarians to describe anyone supporting State regulations and interventions in the economy.
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LiberalZionist
8/14/2019 06:38:57 am
Hi Valar84! So glad that you liked this post, and welcome to the conversation. A few replies to your remarks.
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